Valeriy Pekar, entrepreneur, public figure, publicist, lecturer at Kyiv Mohyla Business School
When describing the scenarios for 2024-2025, I noted that the inertial scenario (i.e. the one that is currently moving) is the worst-case scenario for Ukraine: a war of attrition with the loss of Western support and, as a result, a significant loss of the ability to resist. But this is not the most likely scenario I called. And this is a rather unusual case, because usually the inertial scenario is the most likely. But when there are powerful forces trying to knock down the inertial scenario and switch to some better one, the inertial scenario loses its probability. This is exactly what we have now.
I called the second scenario the most likely – the scenario of a war freeze, which last year looked completely impossible. After all, both Ukrainian society and Putin, who chose the first scenario of a war of attrition, were against freezing the war.
Three months have passed, and now the smell of the second scenario is beginning to be felt in the air. It still looks unacceptable to Ukrainian society and to the Russian leadership. But America and Europe really need it. European industry needs it to build up its defence capabilities. European leaders need him to prepare their societies for change. Biden needs him to run for election as a peacemaker. Trump needs him to criticise Biden for his failure and to levelling the gap created by the failed inter-party struggle. All Ukrainian politicians need him to hold elections and win (they all hope to win).
But even the two main opponents of this scenario cannot boast of a steadfast position.
Ukrainian society as a whole has not come to terms with the categorical need for mobilisation. Politicians are delaying the adoption of the law, and we do not see any fierce public pressure to speed up the process. The people at the front are not eternal and not made of iron, but even the voices of millions of their relatives are not heard against the background of a single marathon.
Likewise, Putin, although he continues to use aggressive rhetoric, sends mixed signals. We do not know what is disguised and what is real, because we do not know the real state of the Russian economy. We don’t know whether the Kremlin believes that time is playing against them or against us. We are not even sure who time is playing for.
China is behind all this. Although it has a strategy of winning in all cases of continuing or ending the war, we do not know if it does not consider the benefits of a truce to be greater. It is very likely that it does, because it has economic problems that the war does not help solve.
Let me remind you that the scenario of a war freeze envisages a second phase of aggression in 3-5-7 years, after Russia has restored its capabilities and learned from the mistakes of the first phase. This means that the destructive impact of the second phase could be greater. To this end, Russia and Ukraine should intensively prepare for this phase – Ukraine with the help of the West, Russia with the help of China.
However, the success of Ukraine’s preparations depends on the outcome of the elections: a victory for the modernisers and accelerated modernisation of the army and state institutions could avert the second phase of the war, while a victory for the populists could lead to poor preparations and the loss of Ukrainian statehood, which is Putin’s strategic goal.
So, it is very likely that in the near future we will be urged from different sides to freeze, appease, ceasefire, etc.
This means that Ukrainian society urgently needs an open and honest dialogue on three key issues:
- Is a freeze acceptable when, on the one hand, Ukraine lacks weapons, mobilisation is slowing down, and there is a chance to hold elections – and, on the other hand, Russia will break the ceasefire at any moment, and people who are determined to disarm Ukraine and Europe may come to power in the United States. In other words, who does time work for – us or our enemies?
- If the answer to the first question is yes, then what are the red lines that cannot be crossed under any circumstances? Obviously, the list of red lines includes the inadmissibility of
– any “demilitarisation”, because it is an invitation to continue aggression;
– giving up European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as this would mean that 10 years have passed in vain;
– recognition of the change in the political status of the occupied territories, as this is a violation of the Constitution.
At the same time, some concessions will have to be made, and the red lines in society need to be discussed for a long time and with high quality.
- If the answer to the first question is no, then what should we do as a society to ensure that the refusal to negotiate and the continuation of the war do not turn into the burning of lives and eventual defeat, but lead us to victory.
And this public dialogue should begin with a discussion of what victory and defeat are. This is not a single bit of information, not a black and white picture: there is a wide spectrum between victory and defeat, including partial victories and defeats, non-victories and defeats. What do the words we use every day mean? Do all sections of society understand them in the same way? Where is the line between acceptable and unacceptable?
This is what we need to talk about in the near future.