The Kursk operation. Advantages and risks. The score is 7:2

Oleksandr Doniy, journalist, politician, public and cultural figure

Pros:

1. Distraction of Russian troops from the Donetsk direction.
   Recently, the enemy has been systematically advancing on the front line in Donetsk region. The Kursk operation is forcing the enemy to regroup its reserves. The enemy’s Donetsk grouping will not be able to claim additional manpower and equipment for some time. With the time gained, we could theoretically send a line of reinforcements to the Donetsk region.
2. Psychological uplift of Ukrainians.
   Psychology and motivation in war are as important resources as the availability of human resources, weapons and funding. The last Ukrainian city (Kherson) was liberated on 11 November 2022, after which Ukraine only lost the territories of several cities that had been completely destroyed. Sociology shows a gradual increase in pessimism. A victorious operation helps to inspire and motivates people to continue fighting the enemy.
3. The enemy’s psychological decline.
   The enemy’s psychological state is equally important. A swift and unexpected operation on Russian territory contributes to despondency among the Russian population, doubts about the ability of their military and political leadership.
4. This is an argument for the political elites of our allies to provide Ukraine with additional arms supplies.
   Ukraine is extremely dependent on supplies and funding from our allies. Recently, assistance has slowed down, in part because of doubts about Ukraine’s ability to achieve success militarily. A successful operation could be an additional argument for increased arms supplies. More weapons – more success.
5. War and destruction of infrastructure on foreign territory.
   The war has been going on for 10 years on Ukrainian soil. On both sides of the frontline. This means that the bombardment on both sides of the frontline is hitting Ukrainian buildings, and Ukrainian land is being saturated with mines and shrapnel on both sides of the frontline. The Kursk operation dramatically changes the vector of infrastructure damage.
6. Replenishment of the “exchange fund” of prisoners.
   The enemy has more prisoners than we do. This is largely due to the forced end of the Mariupol defence, when several thousand Azovstal defenders were taken prisoner. Not all of them have been released yet. An “exchange fund” is needed to free Ukrainian defenders. The Kursk operation was so unexpected that dozens of Russian soldiers were immediately taken prisoner. Now, this is an additional opportunity for the release of Ukrainian defenders who have been captured.
7. Strengthening negotiating positions for future talks with Russia.
   I am still convinced that the noise about the “freezing of the war” along the front line is a Russian information operation, and a detailed analysis of this is not in this article.
   Nevertheless, there are talks about Russia’s possible involvement in some kind of negotiation platform. And for any negotiation, an additional argument can be the strengthening of positions, in this case, territorial strengthening.

7 advantages is a lot.
We talk less about risks. Nevertheless, in order to reduce the risks, or to levelling them, they should be voiced.

Risks:

1. Extension of the front line with a future enemy counter-offensive.
   During a war, an army with fewer resources (human, weapons) is interested in reducing the front line, and an army with more resources (human, weapons) is interested in stretching the front line. A classic example is the Battle of Thermopylae, where a small detachment of Spartans resisted the Persian army, which was many times larger in number, for a long time, thanks to the narrowing of the front line.
   Ukraine objectively has fewer resources, both demographically and in terms of weapons, than the enemy. Recently, Commander-in-Chief Syrsky cited figures that show a significant advantage of the enemy in weapons. In this situation, we are interested in reducing the frontline. For a long time, the enemy has been attacking only along the eastern line – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and partly Kharkiv. The enemy has long since stopped at the north-eastern border along the state border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and most of Kharkiv. And it was a political decision, not a military and tactical one, as in the example along the front line in Kherson region along the Dnipro. Enemy subversive groups were operating from our northeastern border, shelling Kharkiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions, but the enemy did not cross the border with an army. Now such a danger may arise. The enemy can accumulate resources and launch a counter-offensive on Sumy and Kharkiv. And not even for capture, but for total destruction, as in the case of Bakhmut and Avdiivka. I want to believe that the top military and political leadership is aware of this risk and has been preparing to mitigate it.
2. The possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons.
   Russia has nuclear weapons. And it can use it. Those “experts” who categorically deny this possibility are just wishful thinking. Interpretation of Russia’s nuclear doctrine and Russian legislation will take place in the Kremlin, not in the computers of “experts”. Waging war on Russian territory does not guarantee Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons, but it does increase such risks. And we should be aware of this as well.

Both the first and second risks may not necessarily materialise. Nevertheless, we should clearly understand the dangers of their realisation and do everything to prevent them.

The dangers from the first risk should be mitigated by being prepared to repel the enemy on the Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv directions, which means accumulating additional military units, adequate air defence forces, creating fortifications, etc.

Given the information that the authorities have announced the evacuation of the population from the 10-kilometre border strip in Sumy region, we want to believe that the authorities are aware of this risk. In any case, this risk can only be levelled by their own reinforcement and skilful organisation.

The second risk (nuclear) is still smaller, but it should not be forgotten. It can be reduced through successful negotiations with our Western allies. It’s no secret that negotiations or contacts with the enemy at various levels have been going on throughout the war to varying degrees. Therefore, the arguments for deterring Russia from using nuclear weapons have obviously already been presented by our Western allies. Now these arguments need to be recalled and strengthened.

.