A geopolitical tangle: what lies behind US military aid to Ukraine
28 February 2024 08:04
The story of US military aid to Ukraine is a big tangle of interests. Even without the dichotomy of Trump-Biden, part of the Republican Party (Trumpists) against the Democratic Party and part of the Republicans who are against isolationism. ” Kommersant Ukrainsky prepared an article about political intrigues from the left to the right: the American and European approach to military assistance to Ukraine.
American cuisine
Trump is very clear: he wants to return to the White House, not become a bankrupt with a criminal record.
To do this, he will say the opposite things.
For example, he will support Russia in his statements that if it attacks NATO countries that have not reached the 2% defence spending target, it is their own fault.
And in a few days, when Biden has done little for Ukraine, he, Trump, will do more.
And in a few more days, I will sit the parties down at the negotiating table, lock them in one room, and it will seem as if there were no rounds of negotiations in Istanbul, no grain deals broken.
It is a thankless task to consider these statements outside of pre-election populism.
He solved the Kim problem in his last term, and now he will end the war in a day.
In fact, one of the fathers of NATO, its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, expressed the principle of the Alliance well – “It was created to keep the Germans under (control), the Americans in (Europe), and the Russians out of (Europe).”
So if Trump torpedoes NATO with his statements, it is for obvious reasons.
Firstly, the election, where the thesis that if Europeans don’t need it, where Spain has not reached 2% of defence spending, then why do the guys from Texas need it, is quite a good one.
And secondly, some Republicans may not really care about the problems of Taiwan, Israel and Ukraine, but rather about how much insurance voters have, what the minimum wage per hour will be and how many jobs will be taken by Mexicans.
Perhaps due to the long campaigns in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, and then again in Iraq against the Islamic State, Americans are a little fed up with messianism and want to deal with the problems of the “flyover states”.
So we see a banal political struggle in which our interests have become hostage.
Is the Union a paper tiger or an awakened beast?
The accusations of opponents of aid to the EU are also understandable.
The Union has 450 million people and a GDP of $17.2 trillion.
This is a sixth of the world’s GDP.
The defence spending of France, Germany and Italy, even at 2% of GDP, not 6%, as in Moscow, is generally higher than Russia’s $112 billion.
Plus the UK, which is no longer an EU member but actively supports Ukraine and, according to its defence doctrine, is ready to support its partners on the continent.
However, the joint spending of EU countries covers the Russians like a bull covering a cow. Even with the secret parts of the budget, the Russians spend a third of their GDP on war, supporting the economy through sanctions and circumventing restrictions.
Germany alone is half of Russia’s money for security forces. Despite the fact that it has room to grow – during the Cold War, they spent 3-3.5%.
The EU produces medium and heavy long-range air defence systems, missile defence systems, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and combat aircraft.
They have 4000 aircraft of 4-5 generations and thousands of cruise missiles.
A French aircraft carrier, Italian and Spanish helicopter carriers, plus two full-fledged British aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 are already a very tangible advantage.
Two dozen nuclear submarines are almost parity with the Russians, who have to keep the grouping together against both China and the United States.
At the same time, there is talk of when one German brigade will be deployed to the Baltic States, in three years or five? That it takes 10 years to prepare for war. How many years will it take to close what has already been given to Ukraine?
It is clear that companies like Rheinmetall have tasted money for the first time since the Cold War and want it to last as long as possible. But such statements do not make Europe a safer place.
The European shoulder
Is it possible to replace US aid? There are serious amounts of money that are currently being voted on.
$18 billion to replenish defence goods from Pentagon warehouses, reimbursement of training and education under the PDA – all those Stingers, shells, attack drones and Abrams tanks on the balance sheet.
$14.4 billion for intelligence support, technical, medical, increased weapons production, cyber security, etc. From strategic drone flights from Sigonella to new factories.
$12 billion for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative – training and direct procurement from contractors.
$1.7 billion in United States Foreign Military Financing.
But the main thing is not the amount – the main thing is production capabilities, the neck of the bottle in terms of logistics, trained personnel and production of related products.
You may have a ready-made self-propelled artillery system, but you don’t have the software and fire control system, and you have a scrap metal, not a combat unit.
The Russians are able to produce hundreds of T-90 and Armata tanks purely on a financial basis (even with their sovereign wealth fund, which has shrunk considerably).
In reality, however, T-55s and bald T-62s from the early Brezhnev era are burning on the bases.
So having money and having weapons are two different options.
Theoretically, yes – like the tactical level of air defence, the French Crotali, not the US Avengers. But will the Europeans be able to supply hundreds and hundreds of missiles, as they did with the Stingers?
London reported to us on the transfer of 1, 800 different missiles, but these were stockpiles, not wheels of production.
It may be possible to speed up the production of SAMP/T-Mamba missile defence systems, which were once produced at a fairly fast pace for France and Italy, with 700 delivery vehicles ordered for them by MBDA.
But what about missiles for Patriot, especially kinetic missiles?
After all, in the West, more and more systems are avoiding pure air defence, the task of which is performed by aircraft, but kinetics, like a large dart that breaks a target, costs up to $4 million.
It may be possible to buy early versions of the Leo-2 from Sweden, Austria, Spain, and upgrade it to the A5, but the timing is off, and Germany itself is not in time to rearm new battalions.
And all the manufacturers of self-propelled artillery systems in Europe, including the Swedes and excluding the Serbs, are already working like mad for Ukraine.
A heavyweight in the military-industrial complex
But this is all with a prefix. Could have, would have, would have, might have.
Despite all the efforts to produce 1 million-1.5 million shells in 2024, Zaluzhny’s article mentioned 17 million shells as a need for the Defence Forces.
Even if we don’t take such terminal figures, 3 million is not enough for us so far, and they were collected all over the world, from Australia to Canada.
Given that the US produced 10 million 155mm rounds in 1993, I don’t see how we can close the US gap in a few years.
It is possible to cover this with the global market, if, say, Britain and Germany accept the Czech plan to use shells from South Africa, Turkey, India and Korea.
But, for example, France is against it – why would its money be spent on the Turks and Pakistanis, not on the native producers of gunpowder and shells?
The same problem is with air defence missiles. It is realistic to find drones, armoured vehicles, electronic warfare systems on the market, not kinetic missiles and supplies for the same palliatives with Soviet and Western launchers.
So, no, in the short term, we have to wait for the vote in the House and work with the objections.
North Korean missiles are firing at our cities like hotcakes, a couple of dozen have already arrived – it will cost more to strengthen the shield over US bases in Europe than to continue support.
Deploying additional brigades, commands, including artillery, deploying strategic aircraft to Britain, building housing and infrastructure will cost hundreds of billions of dollars over a decade.
And if the United States withdraws from the Old World, there is a good chance that China’s influence on the Union will increase, and this is not what America needs.
And most importantly, although not in the first place, Russia is listed as a competitor to the United States in the country’s main security document.
So, with the Black Sea Fleet knocked out by a third, thousands of tanks and burning oil refineries, Moscow has ceased to be one. For very moderate figures for Washington.
The job needs to be completed.
Author: Kirill Danilchenko