“Finnish model” for Ukraine: what does it mean according to Finnish officials and in reality?
7 November 14:06
ANALYSIS
Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo commented on the idea of “Finnishization of Ukraine” during his speech at the European Political Community Summit in Budapest on November 7. He explained that when the international media discusses the “Finnish model” for Ukraine, it means that Ukraine is not a member of NATO and the EU, but the states of these associations actively support it. The prime minister emphasized that it is this model that Ukrainians are fighting for, reports Komersant ukrainskyi reports citing Radio Liberty.
“The Finnish model is when we – NATO members, EU members – support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. And this is the model that Ukrainians are fighting for,”
– Petteri Orpo said.
The publication notes that among Ukraine’s partners, especially in Germany, the idea of granting Ukraine a neutral status, similar to Finland’s during the Cold War, when the country was neither in NATO nor in the Warsaw Pact, is increasingly being discussed.
However, Finnish President Alexander Stubb has rejected such a model for Ukraine, noting that it undermines the current European security architecture, limits freedom of choice in defense and security matters, and promotes the restoration of old notions of spheres of influence.
So is this really the model Ukrainians are fighting for?
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Finnishization
In the world’s political and legal thought, there is no term “Finnish model” to describe any type of neutrality in international relations. However, there is a term “Finlandization” that refers to significant restrictions on state independence that a large state imposes on its weaker neighbor. This is a process or state of being forced to focus largely on the interests of a neighboring more powerful state (e.g., forced neutrality) and to a lesser extent on the country’s domestic policy.
Finnishization emerged as a consequence of the post-World War II relations between Finland and the USSR in 1944-1989. In World War II, Finland sided with the Third Reich as it sought to regain from the Soviet Union the territories lost in the Soviet-Finnish War. As a losing party, under the terms of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947, Finland ceded the territories of Petsamo, Salla, and the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR, had to pay reparations, and the USSR leased the Porkkala Peninsula.
After that, Finland was forced to take into account the interests of the USSR, refused US aid, and signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. The country retained its independence, democracy, and partially freedom of speech, but adhered to a policy of neutrality, not joining either NATO or the EEC. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland regained political independence, joined the EU in 1995 and NATO in 2023.
The anti-communist opposition in Central Europe viewed Finland’s experience as an alternative to the USSR’s “doctrine of limited sovereignty.”
That is, the term “Finlandization” is used as an example of partial restriction of the sovereignty of formally independent states under the influence of powerful states.
Similar ideas of “Finlandization” of Ukraine were discussed in the 80s and 90s, in particular in the concept of the “Pavlychko Doctrine,” but later Ukraine set a course for Euro-Atlantic integration. However, calls for “Finlandization” were made by opponents of this course and coincided with Russia’s demands that Ukraine’s membership in NATO was unacceptable. Thus, talks about the “Finnish model” with the connotation of “Finlandization” are entirely in line with Russian narratives.
